DEBT STIGMA AND SOCIAL CLASS
Michael D. Sousa
ABSTRACT
For as long as creditors have been extending credit to consumer
debtors, Western society has stigmatized those individuals who failed to
repay their financial obligations or who found themselves swamped by
unmanageable debt. Over the past three decades, scholars have studied
whether the stigma surrounding indebtedness and bankruptcy has declined
or increased in American society, mainly due to the sharp spike in
consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1990s.
These studies have resulted in a general debate over whether debt
stigma still exists in society. Absent from the scholarly literature to date is
an exploration of whether debtors from different social classes have varied
conceptions of what it means to be financially indebted or to file for
bankruptcy protection. Consequently, this Article is the first attempt to
study empirically whether debt stigma varies by socioeconomic class.
Using quantitative data from the General Social Survey, the findings
of this study suggest a systematic pattern between debt stigma and social
class. Specifically, the higher an individual’s social position based upon
factors such as income, education, occupational prestige, and selfidentified social class, the greater the likelihood of agreeing with the idea
that an individual has a right to commit suicide as a result of serious
financial problems. This measure reflects whether one would or should
feel shame, stigma, or embarrassment because of troubling financial debt.
This quantitative finding is then situated within the social psychology
literature, opining that finding oneself in severe financial straits has a
direct bearing on a person’s social identity and self-esteem—matters
inherently tied to social class.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between debtor and creditor is one of unequals.
While it may be the case that at the inception of their relationship the
parties may be of equal standing, once the creditor dispenses the funds to
the debtor a “logic of hierarchy takes hold[,]”1 whereby the debtor can only
restore herself to equality through the full repayment of the indebtedness.
The failure to repay the debt is much more than simple economics—
notions of morality undergird the entire debtor–creditor relationship.2
Indeed, in the languages of early Western Europe, the word “debt” was
synonymous with “fault,” “sin,” and “guilt.”3 More significantly, the
maxim “one must pay one’s debts” has been taken as a foregone virtue
since the earliest civilizations.4 The failure to repay one’s financial
obligations has historically been viewed as a shirking of one’s
responsibilities.5
This underlying notion of morality in the debtor–creditor relationship
is exemplified by both religious doctrine and Western European history.
“The world’s major religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism,
have always instilled in their followers a moral code and conviction that
they must avoid becoming a debtor and, if the follower does become a
debtor, then they stress the importance of repaying one’s financial
obligations.”6 As perhaps a consequence of these religious teachings,
broken financial promises led to extremely harsh treatment of debtors both
in Europe and in the United States prior to the mid-nineteenth century.7
The historical record is replete with evidence of debtors and “bankrupts”
being subjected to various forms of punishment, including pillory and
indentured servitude, in addition to various public shaming rituals.8
The physical harshness by which society historically treated debtors
has now faded, of course, but the moral opprobrium directed at individuals
1. DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 121 (2011); see also BRETT WILLIAMS,
DEBT FOR SALE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE CREDIT TRAP 6 (2004) (describing the debtor–creditor
relationship as “embodied domination”).
2. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 395–
96 (2001) (“Individual bankruptcy has been morally condemned throughout most of human history.”).
3. GRAEBER, supra note 1.
4. According to David M. Tucker, Benjamin Franklin transformed notions of frugality and
repaying debt “into part of the middle-class ethic.” See DAVID M. TUCKER, THE DECLINE OF THRIFT
IN AMERICA: OUR CULTURAL SHIFT FROM SAVING TO SPENDING 9–10 (1991).
5. GRAEBER, supra note 1, at 4; see also Douglas R. Rendleman, Bankruptcy Revision:
Procedure and Process, 53 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1975) (noting generally that “[s]ociety believes
that people should pay just debts”).
6. Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 446
(2013).
7. See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 365, 366
(2006).
8. Sousa, supra note 6, at 448.
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who either cannot pay back their debts or who file for bankruptcy
protection is arguably as stinging as ever.9 From a cultural perspective,
personal indebtedness is still considered “a matter of self-indulgence” in
both the United States and most Western European countries.10 Despite
the combination of stagnant wages and the emergence of significant
income inequality in the United States since the 1970s,11 together with a
shifting of the social safety net away from government and corporations
and onto the shoulders of individuals and families,12 American society still
stigmatizes those who fail in the economic game of life by incurring
unmanageable financial debt.
The most powerful way for a debtor to relieve herself of the pressures
of unmanageable debt is to file for bankruptcy with the goal of receiving
a “discharge” of indebtedness.13 Most scholarly attention regarding the
stigmatization of debt has been in the context of bankruptcy law, perhaps
for obvious reasons. Since the passage of the modern Bankruptcy Code in
1978,14 scholars and commentators have debated whether the stigma
surrounding indebtedness and filing for bankruptcy still exists, and if so,
whether this stigma has either increased or declined in the roughly three
decades following 1978.15 This debate took on greater relevance in the
9. See Zywicki, supra note 2, at 396–97 (“The emergence of this moral indignation is ‘aroused
by the perception of injustice; as such it is part of the emotional underpinning of human morality.’”)
(citation omitted).
10. See GRAEBER, supra note 1, at 379.
11. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 48–49 (2007).
12. JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 21 (2008).
13. Nancy C. Dreher & Matthew E. Roy, Bankruptcy Fraud and Nondischargeability Under
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 N.D. L. REV. 57, 57 (1993) (“The most sweeping remedy
available to a debtor in bankruptcy is the discharge of the debtor’s personal liability to his or her
creditors.”).
14. For a historical discussion of the development of bankruptcy law in the United States, see
generally F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003)
(1919); DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
(2001); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935); Charles Jordan Tabb,
The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
15. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
187, 194 (1998) (arguing that “the increase in filing rates might be attributed to a decline in social
sanctions for promise-breaking and the loss of a sense of shame one feels when such values are
internalized”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 483 (2006) (discussing the justifications for the shift in societal sentiments
regarding filing for bankruptcy); Efrat, supra note 7, at 392 (“Hence, the data suggest that the attitudes
of the American people about bankruptcy petitioners changed in the United States following the 1960s
and have become more sympathetic towards bankruptcy petitioners.”); Sousa, supra note 6, at 463
(finding in a qualitative study that “the overwhelming majority of debtors experienced deep feelings
of shame and embarrassment” about having to file for bankruptcy); Zywicki, supra note 2, at 405 (“It
is generally accepted that one of the factors driving the upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates in
recent decades has been a general decline in the social stigma associated with filing bankruptcy.”)
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mid-1990s when the bankruptcy courts experienced a significant spike in
the number of consumer bankruptcy filings, albeit at a time when the
economy was generally robust.16 As a consequence of this phenomenon,
the credit industry commenced a successful campaign convincing
Congress that individual debtors were “abusing” the bankruptcy process
by filing for bankruptcy at a time when they had the capacity to repay all
or a portion of their debts.17 The 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) were predicated, in part, on the belief that debtors were
abusing the bankruptcy process and that the shame and stigma associated
with bankruptcy had eroded.18
In the past, scholars have studied the phenomenon of debt and
bankruptcy stigma using both qualitative and quantitative research
methods. The past qualitative studies (including my own) explored
bankruptcy and debt stigma by sampling on the dependent variable,
namely, by interviewing individuals who had filed for bankruptcy
protection or who enrolled in Debtors Anonymous, and gauging their
thoughts and experiences about the entire process, including feelings of
stigma and shame.19 To date, the quantitative studies have examined debt

(citation omitted). See generally Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion:
Debtor Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 39 (1998) (“At bottom, the creditors’
argument that there is no more stigma is really based upon circular reasoning. According to the
creditors, there are so many bankruptcies these days, so there must not be any more stigma.”); Teresa
A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress:
An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213,
214–15 (2006) (“The data we present are not consistent with the claim that declining bankruptcy
stigma has fueled an increase in bankruptcy filings. Instead, the data are far more consistent with the
hypothesis that increased filings result from increased financial distress, and they hint that, despite
loud claims to the contrary, the stigma of bankruptcy may actually be increasing.”); Scott A. Fay, Erik
Hurst & Michelle J. White, The Bankruptcy Decision: Does Stigma Matter? (Dep’t of Econ., Univ. of
Mich., Ann Arbor, Working Paper No. 98-01, 1998), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=70915 (opining from a quantitative analysis that the social disapproval of bankruptcy
has decreased over time).
16. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 3 (2000).
17. Michael D. Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 553, 571 (2010); see also Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy
and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U.
MEM. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003) (“Debtor-oriented groups blame creditors for the large amount of credit
card debt and consider this the cause of increased filings. The pro-creditor groups blame individuals
for not being responsible consumers and abusing the bankruptcy system.”) (internal citations omitted);
James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006) (“Critics maintain that the
increase in [bankruptcy] filings is attributable to the disappearance of shame and to the new generosity
of the bankruptcy law that came with, and as a result of, the Code of 1978.”) (citation omitted).
18. Sousa, supra note 6, at 437.
19. See generally Terrell A. Hayes, Stigmatizing Indebtedness: Implications for Labeling
Theory, 23 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 29 (2000); Sousa, supra note 6; Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook,
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and bankruptcy stigma indirectly, using various econometric models to
test whether general stigma surrounding indebtedness and filing for
bankruptcy increased or decreased, particularly during the 1990s when
bankruptcy filing rates spiked significantly.20
This quantitative study takes a different approach by examining the
existence of debt stigma more directly through a nationally representative
sample of Americans who participated in the biannual General Social
Survey (“GSS”) conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago.21 Very
few large-scale, representative, or longitudinal datasets ask respondents
about debt or bankruptcy. However, commencing on a fairly consistent
basis since the 1980s, the GSS has asked respondents a question that
reflects one’s attitude towards severe indebtedness: “Do you think a
person has the right to end his or her own life if this person has gone
bankrupt?” However, the GSS does not specify to respondents what “gone
bankrupt” means, namely, whether this is synonymous with filing for
bankruptcy protection. Consequently, the phrase “gone bankrupt” could
mean different things to different individuals. It is possible that
respondents could interpret “gone bankrupt” to mean either: (1) actually
filing for bankruptcy; (2) having severe debt problems together with the
inability to pay back this debt; (3) having an income insufficient to keep
up with current debt payment obligations; or (4) having assets valued at
less than the extent of the individual’s outstanding debts. Regardless of
how respondents may internalize the import of this survey question, it is
reasonable to presume that it prompts respondents to ponder whether
having financial difficulties is serious enough that suicide would be an
acceptable response to the financial strain.
For purposes of this Article, an affirmative response to this survey
question is used as a proxy for the stigma surrounding debt. That is, a “yes”
response is considered a reflection of the shame, stigma, and
embarrassment one would or should feel (internally or externally) over
being indebted to a significant degree. Methodologically, the GSS
supra note 15, at 213; Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal
Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77 (2006).
20. See, e.g., Kartik Athreya, Shame as It Ever Was: Stigma and Personal Bankruptcy, 90 FED.
RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q., Spring 2004, at 1 (using levels of unsecured borrowing and
bankruptcy filing rates to explain the existence of stigma); Fay, Hurst & White, supra note 15 (using
aggregate bankruptcy filing rates at the national and state levels to test for the presence of bankruptcy
stigma); David. B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Explaining the Increase in Bankruptcy and
Delinquency: Stigma vs. Risk-Composition (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Univ. of Pa., Working Paper 9828-B, 1998), http://d1c25a6gwz7q5e.cloudfront.net/papers/53.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2VF-LD4U]
(contending that debt stigma had declined in the mid-1990s based upon increased credit card
delinquencies).
21. See generally NORC, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, http://gss.norc.org [perma.cc/8H6S8K7E].
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question is being treated as one concerning debt stigma rather than suicide
precisely because the question does not ask respondents whether they
themselves would commit suicide or presently have feelings about suicide
due to their own indebtedness.22
To date, the scholarly literature on debt and bankruptcy stigma has
generally treated all debtors as a singular class of individuals. Absent from
this literature, however, is an examination of whether debtors from
different social classes have varied conceptions of what it means to be
indebted or to file for bankruptcy protection. This Article adds to the
current literature on the stigma surrounding debt by exploring whether
individuals experience and perceive indebtedness differently according to
their social position. As Brett Williams has astutely noted, from a cultural
and sociological perspective, people “experience and imagine debt
according to different social positions.”23 Consequently, this Article is the
first study to empirically address notions of debt stigma according to social
class.
The data from this empirical study suggest that the higher an
individual’s position based upon factors of social class—such as income,
educational level, occupational prestige, and self-identified social class—
the higher the odds an individual will agree with the “suicide upon going
bankrupt” survey question (hereinafter the “debt–stigma” or “suicideupon-bankruptcy” question). This quantitative finding is then situated
within the sociological social psychology literature, theorizing that finding
oneself in severe financial straits or resorting to the bankruptcy process
22. There is robust literature in the social sciences regarding the association between
socioeconomic disadvantage and mental health, including suicide. See, e.g., Patricia Drentea & John
R. Reynolds, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: The Relative Importance of Debt and SES for
Mental Health Among Older Adults, 24 J. AGING & HEALTH 673, 688 (2012) (arguing that “in modern
society, indebtedness is a key component underlying the relationship between socioeconomic position
and mental health”). See generally Sarah Bridges & Richard Disney, Debt and Depression, 29 J.
HEALTH ECON. 388 (2010) (finding that respondents who subjectively perceived themselves as having
debt problems reported a greater incidence of depression); Sarah Brown, Karl Taylor & Stephen
Wheatley Price, Debt and Distress: Evaluating the Psychological Cost of Credit, 26 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 642 (2005) (finding empirically that heads of households reporting substantial debt have
significantly lower levels of psychological well-being compared to those without any debt); Simon
Hatcher, Debt and Deliberate Self-Poisoning, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 111 (1994) (finding a high
prevalence of debt problems among self-poisoning psychiatric patients); R. Jenkins et al., Debt,
Income and Mental Disorder in the General Population, 38 PSYCHOL. MED. 1485 (2008) (finding that
the more debt an individual possessed, the more likely that he or she suffered from mental disorder,
neurosis, psychosis, alcohol dependency, or drug dependency); H. Meltzer et al., Personal Debt and
Suicide Ideation, 41 PSYCHOL. MED. 771 (2011) (finding personal debt to be a significant correlate of
suicide ideation among respondents in a national survey of psychiatric morbidity of adults in England);
Deborah Thorne, Extreme Financial Strain: Emergent Chores, Gender Inequality and Emotional
Distress, 31 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 185 (2010) (finding that indebted wives reported instances of
depression as well as thoughts of suicide and death).
23. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8.
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has a direct bearing on a person’s identity and self-esteem—matters
inherently tied to social class.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I details the prior scholarly
literature on debt and bankruptcy stigma; Part II discusses the study’s
methodology and presents the quantitative findings; Part III offers a
discussion through which the statistical findings on debt stigma and class
are situated within the social psychology literature on social identity and
self-esteem; and the Conclusion suggests further avenues of study.
I.

LITERATURE REVIEW: PAST STUDIES ON DEBT
AND BANKRUPTCY STIGMA

In 1998, Professors Scott Fay, Erik Hurst, and Michelle White
released an unpublished paper on bankruptcy stigma.24 Utilizing a dataset
derived from the 1996 session of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,25
Professors Fay, Hurst, and White developed an econometric model of the
bankruptcy filing decision in order to test two hypotheses: whether (1)
“debtors respond to economic incentives in filing for bankruptcy” (that is,
whether debtors are more prone to file for bankruptcy as the economic
incentive for doing so rises) and (2) “stigma plays an important role in
explaining bankruptcy filings.”26 Considering bankruptcy stigma to be an
expense of filing for bankruptcy due to “the costs of self-disapproval and
disapproval by others,”27 Fay, Hurst, and White predicted that where this
expense of bankruptcy decreases (i.e., less stigma associated with
bankruptcy), an increase in the probability of filing for bankruptcy will
occur.28
To measure decreased stigma quantitatively, Fay, Hurst, and White
relied on essentially two predictors: (1) the number of lawyers per 1,000
people in a particular debtor’s state of residence in a given year (based
upon the assumption that an increase in lawyers practicing in a region
translates into increased competition and consequently lower legal fees
and heightened attorney advertising, thus leading to increased awareness
and reduced stigma) and (2) “attitudes toward bankruptcy are assumed to
24. Fay, Hurst & White, supra note 15.
25. Conducted by the University of Michigan beginning in 1968, the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics “is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women, and
children) and the family units in which they reside. It emphasizes the dynamic aspects of economic
and demographic behavior, but its content is broad, including sociological and psychological
measures.” Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 16, at 245 n.90 (citation omitted).
26. Fay, Hurst & White, supra note 15, at 2.
27. Id. at 6–7. In their economic model, Fay, Hurst, and White also account for other costs
associated with filing for bankruptcy, including out-of-pocket costs for filing fees, costs of attorneys’
fees, informational costs regarding learning about the bankruptcy process, and the costs of reduced
availability of credit post-bankruptcy. Id.
28. Id. at 9.
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depend on the number of people in the area who have filed for bankruptcy
in the past few years.”29 In other words, Fay, Hurst, and White found that
the greater the percentage of individuals in a geographic region who filed
for bankruptcy in the past several years indicated a reduced stigma
regarding the bankruptcy process. This is due to “the spread of information
and change in attitudes that results from high past bankruptcy filing
rates,”30 or what the authors characterize as the “contagion” effect.31 After
running their regression models, Fay, Hurst, and White opined that the
social disapproval of bankruptcy had decreased, which had “caused more
households to file for bankruptcy.”32 In short, Fay, Hurst, and White
determined an increase in the number of bankruptcy filings is indicative
of an inverse proxy for stigma.
Shortly after the release of Fay, Hurst, and White’s study, Professors
David B. Gross and Nicholas S. Souleles offered their own unpublished
econometric study of bankruptcy stigma.33 Reacting to the welldocumented rise in consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1990s, Gross
and Souleles sought to investigate the two leading explanations for the
increased filings: the “risk effect,” whereby recent credit extensions to a
more risky populace resulted in greater defaults, and the “stigma effect,”
whereby it was believed that consumers had become increasingly willing
to default on their financial obligations.34 The dataset utilized by Gross
and Souleles comprised several hundred thousand individual credit card
accounts open during 1995.35 The primary units of analysis were not flesh
and blood individuals but rather their credit card accounts.36
Gross and Souleles tracked these individual credit card accounts for
a period of twenty-four to thirty-two months “to estimate hazard functions
for consumer default, for both bankruptcy and credit card delinquency, and
to assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting
default.”37 The authors’ principal finding was that after controlling for the
“risk effect” (i.e., less creditworthy borrowers obtaining credit, which then
led to increased defaults) and other variables such as account age, payment
history, economic conditions, and purchase history, “a given account was
more likely to go bankrupt in 1996 and 1997 than in 1995.”38 According
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Gross & Souleles, supra note 20.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 12. On this note, Gross and Souleles conclude as follows:
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to Gross and Souleles, these results “are consistent with the view that most
of the recent increase in default is due to a decline in stigma.”39
In 2004 Kartik Athreya, a staff economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, issued the results of his econometric study, which
concluded that the stigma associated with bankruptcy “is by no means
dead” and in fact still played a significant role in the bankruptcy rate.40
Athreya’s model suggested that the increased bankruptcy filing rates
during the 1990s were attributed not necessarily to a diminished stigma
associated with bankruptcy but rather to the reduced costs to financial
institutions of extending credit to debtors, as well as to increased
competitiveness among financiers in unsecured credit card lending.41
In 2006, Professors Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay
Westbrook culled data from their long-standing Consumer Bankruptcy
Project42 to test the claim that the stigma associated with consumer
bankruptcy had fallen over time. Responding directly to the previous
econometric studies, Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
criticized that when the econometric studies cannot “find a strong
statistical correlation between bankruptcy and a handful of
macroeconomic indicators,” the economists attribute the precipitous rise
in bankruptcy filings “to the unmeasured concept that they conveniently
label[ ] as a reduction in stigma.”43 That is, these econometric studies
assume a decline in stigma is the operative indicator for what otherwise
cannot be explained.44
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook opined that if bankruptcy stigma
had declined from 1981 to 2001, then there would be an appreciable
change in the financial circumstances of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors
over this twenty-year period.45 More particularly, if stigma indeed
declined over the years from 1981 to 2001, the authors predicted a marked
increase in the presence of “better off” or “can pay” debtors among the

Even after controlling for risk-composition and other economic fundamentals, the
propensity to default significantly increased between mid-1995 and mid-1997. A credit
card holder in 1997 was 1 percentage point more likely to declare bankruptcy and 4
percentage points more likely to go delinquent than a cardholder with identical risk
characteristics in 1995.
Id. at 15.
39. Id.
40. Athreya, supra note 20, at 3.
41. Id. at 16.
42. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project consists of “three large studies of natural persons filing
for bankruptcy in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 in 1981, 1991, and 2001.” Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook,
supra note 15, at 218.
43. Id. at 216–17.
44. Id. at 217 n.16.
45. Id. at 236.
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Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 pool of bankruptcy petitions.46 The authors
tested this hypothesis by examining the debt-to-income ratio of debtors in
their dataset; according to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, if the stigma
had declined, then there should be a decreased median debt-to-income
ratio for the group of debtors as a whole.47
However, they did not find this to be the case. Instead, as a group,
the debtors were much worse off financially in 2001 than in 1981. The
debt-to-income ratio through the twenty-year period rose from 1.4 to 3.0
for overall debt (i.e., total debt owed per debtor in 1981 was approximately
eighteen months’ worth of income, whereas it jumped to approximately
three years’ worth of income in 2001) and from 0.79 to 1.5 for nonmortgage debt-to-income.48 The authors thus concluded as follows:
Instead of finding more can-pay debtors in bankruptcy, our data
suggest that even the most-able-to-pay debtors are in worse shape in
2001 than in 1981. In 1981, the top 10% of bankrupt debtors best able
to pay owed an average of 17% of their annual incomes in
nonmortgage debt; in 2001 they also owed 17% of a year’s income.
But the ratio of total debts to annual income got significantly worse:
the average total debt-to-income ratio rose from 30% of income to
63% . . . .
. . . . There is no evidence of a cohort of convenience filers who in
2001 were willing to enter bankruptcy with lighter debt burdens
because they were no longer troubled by the stigma imposed by
bankruptcy in times past. It would be hard to produce more
compelling evidence that the rise in bankruptcy filings cannot be
attributed in any significant part to a decline in the stigma associated
with bankruptcy.49

From this, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued that contrary to
those who professed a decline in bankruptcy stigma, the phenomenon had
not declined since the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code.50
Instead, the marked increase in bankruptcy filings from 1981 to 2001 was
attributed to individuals experiencing increased financial distress in their
lives.51
Much like Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, Professors F.H.
Buckley and Margaret F. Brinig conducted their own empirical study to
shed light on the dramatic rise in consumer bankruptcy filings from 1985
46. Id. at 237–38.
47. Id. at 238.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 239.
50. Id. at 214–15.
51. Id.
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to 1991. This period was ironically marked by national economic
prosperity and changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 that were designed
to make the use of Chapter 7 less palatable for some debtors.52 Buckley
and Brinig utilized a regression analysis of consumer bankruptcy filing
rates with various legal, economic, and social variables for eighty-six
federal judicial districts from the period of 1980 to 1991.53 According to
the authors, neither legal variables, such as the level of allowable assets
exempt from creditors’ reach, nor economic variables, such as
unemployment rate and incidence of poverty, were able to explain the
increased filing rates during this period.54 Rather, Buckley and Brinig
suggested that the increased filing rate during this time was attributable to
changes in social norms and, more particularly, to a decline in the social
sanctions surrounding bankruptcy, along with an overall weakening of the
social stigma of promise-breaking.55
In response to what he perceived as the shortcomings of previous
empirical studies on bankruptcy stigma, namely, the inability of both the
econometric and statistical approaches to sufficiently represent the general
public’s perception of bankruptcy stigma, Professor Rafael Efrat sought to
measure the evolution of bankruptcy stigma over time by examining the
content of 176 newspaper articles published in the New York Times
between 1864 and 2002.56 According to Efrat, the “examination of the
content of consumer bankruptcy related newspaper articles provides
valuable insight into the evolution of public perception of bankrupts
during th[is] period.”57 Efrat’s study of the newspaper articles enabled him
to ascertain the “embedded messages” contained within the articles and to
evaluate whether a particular article struck a positive, negative, or neutral
tone with respect to filing for bankruptcy, the characterization of
bankruptcy debtors, and the validity of seeking formal debt relief under
the then-existing bankruptcy legislation.58
Efrat used the embedded messages “as a proxy for broad and
evolving societal perceptions about the bankruptcy population.”59 The
result of Efrat’s study suggests a shift in the discourse regarding
bankruptcy stigma commencing in the 1960s.60 As Efrat found, prior to
52. Buckley & Brinig, supra note 15, at 187.
53. For a detailed discussion of Professors Buckley and Brinig’s methodology, see id. at 191–
202.
54. Id. at 202.
55. Id. at 200–02.
56. Efrat, supra note 7, at 385.
57. Id. at 385.
58. Id. at 386–88.
59. Id. at 388.
60. Id. at 389.
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the 1960s, the New York Times newspaper articles referred to bankruptcy
debtors in negative terms, such as “evil doers,” “cheaters,” and “crooks[,]”
while attributing debtors’ financial failures as self-imposed.61 In contrast,
newspaper articles beginning in the 1960s adopted a more positive attitude
towards bankruptcy debtors, often characterizing them as “hardworking,
poor, struggling, and needy”62 while at the same time attributing their
respective financial woes to exogenous events, such as unemployment,
high inflation, medical illness, or divorce.63 Based on this, Efrat argued
that the public’s attitude towards debtors who file for bankruptcy has
softened over time, calling into question whether bankruptcy stigma has
indeed diminished during the last approximately 150 years.64
Professor Terrell Hayes conducted a series of in-depth interviews
with forty-six members of Debtors Anonymous in an effort to determine
empirically whether the social psychological concept of labeling theory
applied to individuals with a “low visibility” of indebtedness.65 Through
his series of interviews, Hayes concluded that all forty-six individuals
experienced a form of labeling, which in turn produced feelings of
shame.66 Hayes identified three forms of labeling: direct, indirect, and selflabeling. Some of Hayes’s participants experienced episodes of direct
labeling during interpersonal communications with family members,
friends, and strangers. Direct labeling occurred when negative statements
and opinions of indebtedness in general and dissatisfaction with the
debtor’s conduct in particular were shared with the debtor.67 Upon learning
of the debt situation, some of these individuals also expressed their
opinions that the debtor had a problem with finances that needed
correcting.68 At some point, these interactions caused debtors to feel shame
about their conduct in incurring unmanageable debt.69
The participants in Hayes’s study also experienced indirect labeling,
which is subtle and suggestive rather than confrontational (as with direct
labeling). The indirect labeling occurred in interpersonal exchanges
through verbal cues (e.g., suggestions or questions), nonverbal means
(e.g., body language and facial expressions), or a combination of both.70
Similarly, episodes of indirect labeling also eventually led to feelings of
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 390.
64. Id. at 390–91.
65. Hayes, supra note 19, at 30–31.
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id. at 33–35.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 36.
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shame for the debtors.71 Finally, in Hayes’s study some of the participants
also engaged in self-labeling, leading to feelings of embarrassment and
shame over their conduct in incurring unmanageable debt even though no
one else knew of their problem.72 Moreover, Hayes found that although
the three forms of labeling invoked shame, it usually arose only after
debtors experienced a period of denial over the existence and extent of
their financial problem.73
In 2006, Professors Deborah Thorne and Leon Anderson published
their qualitative study of bankruptcy stigma after conducting semistructured interviews with former Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors. Thorne
and Anderson collected data directly from debtors in order “to assess their
experiences of stigmatization.”74 More particularly, Thorne and Anderson
centered their analysis on the “stigma management strategies [debtors]
invoke to mitigate the shame and social disapprobation [the debtors]
experienced as a result of their bankruptcies.”75
Thorne and Anderson found that 95% of the debtors they interviewed
in their study expressed feelings of shame and stigmatization as they
underwent the bankruptcy process.76 Thorne and Anderson categorized
debtors’ stigma management techniques into three generalized categories:
“concealment,” “avoidance,” and “deviance avowal.”77 As to the first
category, Thorne and Anderson found that 80% of their participants made
a concerted effort to conceal their bankruptcy filings from either their
parents, co-workers, employers, or some combination of these
constituencies. As Thorne and Anderson described, “[a]nxiety over the
possibility of . . . disclosure loomed large in interviewees’ experiences.”78
With respect to the management strategy of “avoidance,” Thorne and
Anderson found that the fear of potential stigmatization caused debtors to
engage in a variety of behaviors in an effort “to avoid situations that might
lead to embarrassing or degrading interactions with non-intimates who
would have particular reason to uncover their economic troubles and
failures.”79 Bill collectors fall most prominently into this category. The
debtors in the Thorne and Anderson study avoided answering the phone,
shunned opening the mailbox, and utilized caller ID to screen incoming

71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 41.
73. Id. at 43.
74. Thorne & Anderson, supra note 19, at 78.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 82–83.
77. Id. at 83.
78. Id. at 85.
79. Id. at 86.
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phone calls.80 Other debtors physically hid from friends and family
members, lest their economic situation be exposed and questioned.81
The third management strategy utilized by debtors was identified by
Thorne and Anderson as “deviance avowal,” a theory that originates in the
sociological literature. The disavowal of the discredited “bankruptcy
debtor” status, according to Thorne and Anderson, “enabled individuals to
cope with stigma by arguing in one way or another that their particular
cases were emphatically not examples of typical deviant role enactment.”82
In essence, by utilizing deviance avowal, the debtors in the Thorne and
Anderson study attempted to separate themselves and their conduct from
the discredited status of bankrupt debtor. They accomplished this feat
through “distancing,” “accounts,” and “post-bankruptcy actions and
statements directed toward transcending their stigmatized status.”83
As Thorne and Anderson found, the concept of distancing was very
common among the debtors in their study; that is, debtors “went to
considerable lengths to distinguish their ‘legitimate’ reasons for declaring
bankruptcy from the otherwise illegitimate and morally objectionable
actions and rationales of other bankrupt debtors.”84 The debtors in the
Thorne and Anderson study accomplished this distancing by, among other
ways, depicting other debtors as financially frivolous and profligate, or as
simply lacking in financial self-control.85 In contrast to these qualities, the
debtors interviewed by Thorne and Anderson self-described their prebankruptcy consumption behaviors as “conservative” and “based on
necessities” rather than luxuries.86
Regarding the use of “accounts” as a deviance avowal strategy,
Thorne and Anderson found that the debtors in their study often provided
“excuses” and “justifications” for their bankruptcy filings, all in an effort
to “soften the moral breach” of their deviant act.87 Using excuses to
explain their bankruptcy filings allowed debtors to deny responsibility for
their conduct and to find a scapegoat for their behavior.88 For example,
debtors in the Thorne and Anderson study blamed lenders for the need to
file bankruptcy relief; they characterized the lenders as irresponsibly
setting debtors up for failure by virtue of their lending practices.89 Other
80. Id.
81. Id. at 86–87.
82. Id. at 87.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 88.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 91.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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debtors excused their bankruptcy filings by relying on unexpected or
exogenous events, such as a job downsizing, medical illness, or
downtrodden economy.90
In the last form of deviance avowal, Thorne and Anderson found that
debtors attempted to “transcend” their bankruptcy experience by
promising some form of future action that would hopefully effectuate a
“destigmatization” of their devalued status, such as by repaying some of
the discharged debt or by utilizing the knowledge gained “through their
financial travails to help others avoid similar problems” in the future.91
In 2013, I published my own qualitative study of bankruptcy stigma
based upon fifty-eight in-depth interviews with former Chapter 7
debtors.92 The consumer debtors in my study expressed a wide range of
attitudes and feelings regarding their indebtedness, which I categorized
into three sub-groupings of responses. A portion of the debtors conveyed
the expected internalized feelings of shame and stigma regarding their
debt. A second sub-grouping expressed little to no shame over having filed
for bankruptcy and instead identified justifications for the filing. The third
sub-grouping expressed what I described as a “diluted sense of shame.”93
Although these individuals felt some degree of shame and embarrassment
regarding their financial past, they tempered their feelings by either
blaming their circumstances on external events, rationalizing that
bankruptcy is commonplace, or engaging in deviance avowal as identified
by Thorne and Anderson.
Given the existing literature on debt and bankruptcy stigma, this
study attempts to forge new ground by investigating whether debt stigma
is experienced differently depending upon social class, and what possible
bearing such a finding might have on an individual’s sense of self-esteem
and personal identity. The next Part reports the study’s methodology and
principal findings.
II.

METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

Since 1972, the GSS has gathered data on American society “in order
to monitor and explain trends and constants in attitudes, behaviors and
attributes” of the American population.94 The GSS is a biannual,
representative sample of non-incarcerated, non-homeless American
adults.95 “The GSS contains a standard core of demographic, behavioral,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 93.
92. See generally Sousa, supra note 6, at 446.
93. Id. at 463.
94. NORC, supra note 21.
95. DAVID KREMELBERG, PRACTICAL STATISTICS 66 (2011).
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and attitudinal questions, plus topics of special interest. Among the topics
covered are civil liberties, crime and violence, intergroup tolerance,
morality, national spending priorities, psychological well-being, social
mobility, and stressful and traumatic events.”96
As noted above, one attitudinal question the GSS asks respondents
relates to bankruptcy and indebtedness. In particular, the GSS researchers
ask survey respondents the following question: “Do you think a person has
the right to end his or her own life if this person has gone bankrupt?”97
Like many cross-sectional, representative social surveys, the GSS does not
necessarily ask the same questions every year. With respect to this suicideupon-bankruptcy question, the GSS did not ask this question prior to 1977,
and omitted this question from the surveys in 1980, 1984 and 1987.
However, the GSS has included this question with relative consistency
since 1988.
To test the research question regarding debt stigma and social class,
four discrete interval years were chosen for statistical analysis:1983, 1994,
2004, and 2014. Because the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question was not
asked of respondents in 1984, 1983 was chosen as the initial year—
notably, having been taken only a few years after the promulgation of the
1978 Bankruptcy Code.98 It is believed that 1994 serves as another
significant year because the credit industry’s lobbying efforts and public
advertising campaigns regarding allegedly immoral debtors filing for
bankruptcy protection had already commenced.99 Further, as previously
noted, the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were largely
premised upon the notion that “can-pay” debtors were simply shirking
their contractual responsibilities by shedding their debts in Chapter 7
bankruptcy.100 Thus, the year 2004 was selected to gauge attitudes prior to
the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, 2014 was selected
in keeping with the ten-year interval increments, and the year represents a
period of time after BAPCPA normalized bankruptcy law, as well as a
time after the Great Recession of 2008.
In 1983, 6.57% of GSS respondents answered the debt–stigma
question in the affirmative, that is, agreeing with the question that an
96. NORC, supra note 21.
97. The GSS asks three other independent attitudinal questions regarding whether a person has
a right to end his or her life based upon some condition or event as follows: (1) “Do you think a person
has the right to end his or her own life if this person has an incurable disease?”; (2) “Do you think a
person has the right to end his or her own life if this person has dishonored his or her family?”; and
(3) “Do you think a person has the right to end his or her own life if this person is tired of living and
ready to die?”
98. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
99. Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 189, 194 (1999).
100. See supra Part I.
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individual has the right to end his or her life if he or she goes bankrupt
(103 out of 1,568). Eleven years later in 1994, 9.33% of respondents
answered this question in the affirmative (181 out of 1,939). Ten years
later, and the year before BAPCPA took effect (2004), the percentage of
affirmative responses increased to 11.27% (101 out of 896). This upward
trend in percentage increases continued in 2014, where 12.12% of the GSS
respondents answered the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question in the
affirmative (200 out of 1,650). Consequently, these raw numbers provide
some evidence of an increased notion of debt stigma over a thirty-one-year
period of time.
To begin testing whether notions regarding debt stigma vary by
social class, the variables of education, occupational prestige score, and
annual income were used to test whether the means of these continuous
variables differed by how respondents answered the debt–stigma question
for each year studied.101 These variables are frequently used as indicators
of objective socioeconomic status.102 Table 1 provides the means for these
variables for 1983.
Table 1.
1983
(means)
Suicideuponbankruptcy
“Yes”
“No”

Income

Years of
Education

Occupational
Prestige Score

$34,827.91
$27,621.71

14.02
12.34

45.34
38.65

To test whether these differences are statistically significant for
1983, an independent, two-tailed t-test (assuming equal variances) was
conducted using an alpha of 95% (.05).103 Table 2 presents the results for
1983.
Table 2.
1983
t statistic
df

Income
-2.4138
1566

Years of
Education
-3.8054
1566

Occupational
Prestige Score
-3.9374
1566

101. All statistical tests were performed using the STATA statistical software program.
102. Spencer L. James & Paul R. Amato, Self-Esteem and the Reproduction of Social Class, 94
SOC. SCI. Q. 933, 941 (2013).
103. Simply put, t-tests “are used when you want to test the difference between two groups on
some continuous variable.” KREMELBERG, supra note 95, at 129.
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Based upon the obtained p values, there is a statistically significant
difference in the means for income, educational level, and occupational
prestige score between those who agree with the debt–stigma question and
for those who do not. The probabilities that these differences are real are
98.41% for income, 99.99% for education, and 99.99% for occupational
prestige score. Tables 3 and 4 replicate these tests for 1994.
Table 3.
1994
(means)
Suicideuponbankruptcy
“Yes”
“No”

Income

Years of
Education

Occupational
Prestige Score

$35,588.51
$26,757.22

15.08
13.22

45.93
41.00

Table 4.
1994
t statistic
df
p value

Income

Years of
Education
-4.9260
1937
.0001

Occupational
Prestige Score
-4.0049
1937
.0001

-4.1395
1937
.0001

Based upon the obtained p values, in 1994 a statistically significant
difference remains in the means for income, educational level, and
occupational prestige score between those who agree with the suicideupon-bankruptcy question and for those who do not. The probabilities that
these differences are real are 99.99% for income, education, and
occupational prestige score. Tables 5 and 6 replicate these tests for the next
interval year, 2004.
Table 5.
2004
(means)
Suicideuponbankruptcy
“Yes”
“No”

Income

Years of
Education

Occupational
Prestige Score

$41,169.94
$31,947.46

15.12
13.58

45.87
40.49
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.0191

Years of
Education
-3.6604
894
.0003
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Occupational
Prestige Score
-3.1784
894
.0015

Ten years later, a similar difference in means demonstrates these
three factors are indicative of whether someone will agree or disagree with
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. The probabilities that these
differences are real are 98.09% for income, 99.97% for years of education,
and 99.85% for occupational prestige. Tables 7 and 8 provide data for
2014, the final interval year in the study.
Table 7. 2014 Income
(means)
Suicide-uponbankruptcy
“Yes”
$40,922.15
“No”
$28,349.58

Table 8. 2014

Income

t statistic
df
p value

-5.0392
1648
.0001

Years of
Education

Occupational
Prestige Score

14.50
13.62

46.74
41.21

Years of
Education
-5.0030
1648
.0001

Occupational
Prestige Score
-4.6612
1648
.0001

As evidenced in Tables 7 and 8, this trend of statistical significance
between the measures of objective social class continued a decade later in
2014. The probabilities that these observed differences are due to a real
effect are 99.99% for all three variables, namely, annual income, years of
education, and occupational prestige score.
The data provided in Tables 1 through 8 detail the existence of real
differences between individuals who responded either “yes” or “no” to the
debt–stigma question based upon objective indicators of social class. The
next step of the research design was to uncover whether associations
existed between these individuals and other attitudinal questions as
measured by the GSS. The following five variables proved fruitful for
exploration as affecting one’s proclivity to respond to a question justifying
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suicide as a response to financial indebtedness: (1) self-identified social
class; (2) whether the respondent reported themselves as “happy” in life
generally; (3) a respondent’s political views; (4) a respondent’s categorical
educational classification; and (5) a respondent’s strength of religious
affiliation.
For self-identified social class, respondents were asked to categorize
themselves as either lower-class, working-class, middle-class, or upperclass. The variable “happy”104 was used as a substitute for a respondent’s
mental health, as questions specifically addressing mental health (e.g., the
existence of depression or number of poor mental health days in the past
30 days) were not introduced by the GSS until the late 2000s.105 The
“happy” variable was recoded into three categories, namely, “not too
happy,” “pretty happy,” and “very happy.” A respondent’s political views
was recoded from seven discrete responses into three general categories,
namely, “liberal,” “moderate,” and “conservative.” Years of education
was recoded from a continuous variable into a categorical variable,
employing the following four possible categories for respondents: less
than high school, high school, some college, and college graduate. Finally,
as coded by the GSS, a respondent’s religious affiliation is divided into the
following four categories: “no religion,” “somewhat strong” religious
affiliation, “not very strong” religious affiliation, and “strong” religious
affiliation. This variable was not recoded for purposes of analysis.
To explore whether a relationship exists between these categorical
variables and the dummy variable106 of answering “yes” or “no” to the
suicide-upon-bankruptcy question, a series of chi-square tests were
performed.107 All of the chi-square tests reported were conducted at an
alpha of .05 (95%).

104. The specific GSS survey question for the “happy” variable is as follows: “Taken all
together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty
happy, or not too happy?”
105. The GSS does ask respondents questions regarding their mental health. One question is as
follows: “Has a doctor, nurse, or other health professional ever told you that you had depression?” In
addition, respondents are also asked the following question: “Now thinking about your mental health,
which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 30
days was your mental health not good?” The first question was only asked of respondents in 2014,
while the second question regarding mental health was first introduced in 2002 and has not been
consistently asked since that time. Consequently, the “happy” variable was chosen as a proxy for a
particular respondent’s state of mental health, particularly since this question has been asked by the
GSS consistently since 1972.
106. A “dummy variable” is a “variable that has been recoded so that one of its categories has a
value of 1 and the other category has a value of 0.” ROYCE A. SINGLETON, JR. & BRUCE C. STRAITS,
APPROACHES TO SOCIAL RESEARCH 521 (6th ed. 2018).
107. “The chi-square statistic is used to show whether or not there is a relationship between two
categorical variables.” KREMELBERG, supra note 95, at 120. Accord ANNA LEON-GUERRERO &
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Table 9. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Self-Identified
Class
Year
1983
1994
2004
2014
Chi-Square 2(3)(N=788) 2(3)(N=1936) 2(3)(N=893) 2(3)(N=1641)
Statistic
=14.39
=14.4
=6.44
=19.8
p value
.002
.010
.092
.0001

Table 9 reports the results of the chi-square test of independence
regarding the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question and a respondent’s selfidentified class. Based upon the obtained p values in 1983, 1994, and 2014,
there is a statistically significant relationship between respondents’ selfidentified social class and their response to the suicide-upon-bankruptcy
survey question. For 2004, the obtained p value is marginally significant.
Nonetheless, it appears that from 1983 to 2014, people’s self-identified
social class is statistically associated with their response to the debt–
stigma question in the GSS.
Table 10. Chi-Square Test
Happiness
Year
1983
Chi-Square 2(2)(N=1544)
Statistic
=19.84
p value
0.928

for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and General
1994
2(2)(N=1935)
=1.53
0.466

2004
2(2)(N=894)
=.032
0.984

2014
2(2)(N=1641)
=.197
0.906

Table 10 reports the chi-square results regarding the general
happiness variable. Because the p values for general happiness are larger
than the tested alpha at .05 (95%), these results are not statistically
significant, representing a lack of association between people’s general
happiness and their proclivity to either agree or disagree with the suicideupon-bankruptcy survey question.
Table 11. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Strength of
Religious Affiliation
Year
1983
1994
2004
2014
Chi-Square
2(3)(N=1544) 2(3)(N=1872) 2(3)(N=881) 2(3)(N=162
Statistic
=22.7
=69.17
=22.57
9)=33.3
p value
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001

CHAVA FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS, ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR A DIVERSE SOCIETY 228
(2015).
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The same, however, cannot be said for the association between one’s
strength of religious affiliation and the response to the debt–stigma
question. As demonstrated in Table 11, there is a statistically significant
relationship between these two variables. In other words, there is a
statistical association between an individual’s response to the suicideupon-bankruptcy survey question and one’s religious affiliation. Tables 12
and 13 test the association between the debt–stigma question and one’s
political views and educational level, respectively.
Table 12. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Political Views
Year
1983
1994
2004
2014
Chi-Square 2(2)(N=760) 2(2)(N=1877) 2(2)(N=873) 2(2)(N=1606)
Statistic
=4.74
=23.85
=14.55
=16.8
p value
0.093
0.001
0.001
0.001

Table 13. Chi-Square Test for “Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy” and Education Level
Year
1983
1994
2004
2014
Chi-Square 2(3)(N=1568) 2(3)(N=1939) 2(3)(N=896) 2(3)(N=1650)
Statistic
=47.87
=47.58
=41.37
=48.7
p value
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Table 12 demonstrates a statistically significant relationship between
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question and one’s political views for
years 1994, 2004, and 2014; however, for 1983, this relationship is
marginally significant but nevertheless important. In Table 13, the data
reveal a statistically significant relationship across all years between
people’s level of education and their response to the suicide-uponbankruptcy question. As a result of the chi-square tests, a statistically
significant association exists between the debt–stigma question and the
variables of self-identified class, strength of religious affiliation, political
views, and level of education—but not one’s mental state of relative
happiness.
In order to further investigate the relationship of these variables upon
the debt–stigma question, a series of logistic regression models were
performed.108 Out of the 9,941 GSS respondents overall in the years 1983,

108. Logistic regression was chosen primarily because the dependent variable (i.e., the suicideupon-bankruptcy question) is a binary variable. The variable “happy” was omitted from the regression
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1994, 2004, and 2014, 6,053 answered the suicide-upon-bankruptcy
question (61%). In addition, another 1,055 respondents have missing data
on other predictor variables (10.6%), thereby rendering an actual sample
size of 4,998 respondents for the regression models. Table 14 reports the
descriptive statistics for the predictor variables while Table 15 presents the
results of the regression models.

models because the initial tests demonstrated no association between general happiness and
responding to the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question.
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Table 14. Descriptive Statistics
“Yes”
Suicide-uponBankruptcy

“No”
Suicide-uponBankruptcy

(Mean/SD)
.5302/.4991
46.65/7.35

(Mean/SD)
.4881/.5004
43.82/15.39

(Mean/SD)
.5350/.4988
46.97/17.53

.8117/.3909
.1313/.3377
.0570/.2319
$30,106.50/
$32,629.83

.8498/.3576
.1008/.3013
.0494/.2169
$38,241.69/
$37,373.89

.8074/.3944
.1347/.3414
.0579/.2335
$28,165.71/
$30,343.81

All Years
Variable
Sex
Age
Race
White
African-American
Other

Annual Income
Occupational
Prestige
41.72/15.76
46.64/14.68
41.16/15.78
Political View
Liberal
.2613/.4394
.3913/.4885
.2467/.4311
Moderate
.3866/.4870
.3063/.4614
.3956/.4890
Conservative
.3521/.4777
.3024/.4597
.3577/.4794
Education
College Graduate .2781/.4481
.5079/.5004
.2522/.4343
Less than
High School
.1635/.3698
.0771/.2670
.1732/.3785
High School
.2943/.4558
.1542/.3615
.3101/.4626
Some College
.26411/.4409 .2609/.4395
.2645/.4411
Religious
Affiliation
No Religion
.1383/.3452
.2984/.4580
.1202/.3252
Somewhat Strong .0892/.2851
.0573/.2327
.0928/.2902
Not Very Strong
.3944/.4888
.3933/.4889
.3945/.4888
Strong
.3782/.4850
.2510/.4340
.3925/.4884
Source: The General Social Survey (Years 1983, 1994, 2004, 2014)
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Table 15. Logistic Regression Models for Dependent Variable
“Suicide-upon-Bankruptcy”
Model
Model
Model
Model
1
2
3
4

989

Model
5

Model
6

Odds Ratio

Odds
Ratio

Odds
Ratio

Odds
Ratio

Odds
Ratio

Odds
Ratio

(SE)

(SE)

(SE)

(SE)

(SE)

(SE)

*
* 1.2296
*
-0.0557

*
* 1.2538
*
-0.0569

*
* 1.1565
*
-0.0535
† 0.8332

Demo
graphics
Year

1.2146
-0.0549

Sex
AfricanAmerican

0.8765

0.8638

0.844

-0.0837

-0.0825

-0.0804

0.7475

† 0.723

-0.118
Other
Race

0.6849

-0.1139

0.9866
-0.0029

-0.1151

† 0.7049

-0.1504
Age

* 0.7277

0.6703

-0.1549
*
* 0.9843
*
-0.003

-0.1472
*
* 0.9841
*
-0.0029

-0.0802
* 0.7709
-0.1225
† 0.6637
-0.1468
*
* 0.9888
*
-0.003

*
1.1725
*
-0.0549
† 0.8619

*
* 1.0925
*
-0.0521
0.9204

-0.0836

-0.0911

0.8173

0.9064

-0.1314

-0.1475

† 0.6923

† 0.6829

-0.1535

-0.1539

*
* 0.9864
*
-0.0031

*
* 0.9932
*
-0.0032

SES
Annual
Income

1.0418

*
*
*

1.0102

-0.0066
Occupation

-0.0075
1.0245

*
*
*

1.007

-0.0033
WorkingClass

-0.0035
1.2299

1.0242

* 1.0093
-0.0036
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-0.2894

MiddleClass

2.0171

-0.2445
*
*

1.1605

-0.4685
UpperClass

3.8915

-0.2826
*
*
*

1.6699

-1.1663
Less than
School

High

0.2501
-0.045

High
School

0.2594
-0.0353

Some
College
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0.487
-0.0565

-0.543
*
* 0.3345
*
-0.0669
*
* 0.3245
*
-0.0491
*
* 0.5701
*
-0.0711

Religion
Somewhat
Strong

*
* 0.3054
*
-0.0601
*
* 0.3025
*
-0.045
*
* 0.5413
*
-0.0671

0.2957
-0.0651
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Source: The General Social Survey (Survey Years 1983, 1994, 2004 & 2014)
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10.

Model 1 includes the demographic indicators of sex, race, and age
because these measures are inherently related to suicide.109 Of these three,
only age is statistically significant (p < .001), suggesting a positive
association between one’s age and agreeing with the debt–stigma question.
For each one-year increase in age, the odds of agreeing with the debt–
stigma question decrease by 1.34%. The year variable is statistically
significant as well (p < .001); with each additional ten-year period of time,
the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question actually increase by
21.5%. This is further evidence suggesting that the stigma surrounding
debt and bankruptcy has actually increased over time rather than
decreased.110 Regarding the measures of socioeconomic class, Model 1
includes annual income as a covariate. Annual income is statistically
significant (p < .001); with every $5,000 increase in an individual’s annual
income, the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question increase by
4.2%. In other words, Model 1 presents a positive association between
higher income and agreeing with the debt–stigma question.
Model 2 replaces occupational prestige as a covariate for annual
income to test whether occupational prestige is also positively associated
with a response to the debt–stigma question. Age remains statistically
significant (p < .001), where each additional year in age reduces the odds
of agreeing with the debt–stigma question by 1.57%. Controlling for other
variables, occupational prestige is statistically significant (p < .001), as
was annual income in Model 1. For each one-unit increase in occupational
prestige score, the odds of agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy
question increase by 2.5%. This finding suggests that the higher a person’s
occupational prestige as measured by societal standards, the likelihood of
agreeing with the debt–stigma question increases.111

109. The reference group for the reported logistic regression models is a (1) white; (2) male; (3)
who self-identifies as lower-class; (4) with a college education; (5) with no religious affiliation; and
(6) who identifies as politically liberal.
110. See generally Michael D. Sousa, The Persistence of Bankruptcy Stigma, 26 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (finding that the stigma surrounding personal bankruptcy has
generally increased from 1978 to 2014).
111. As demonstrated in Table 15, race is also statistically significant (p < .001). As compared
to whites, African-Americans have reduced odds of 27.71% in agreeing with the debt–stigma question.
While notions of race are inextricably bound with measures of social class, this Article does not
examine the effect of race as a predictor for the dependent variable.
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Model 3 introduces the covariate of self-identified social class and
replaces it for the occupational prestige variable from Model 2.112
Regarding self-identified social class, the respondents who identify as
either middle-class or upper-class are statistically significant in
comparison to the reference group, namely, those respondents who
identify as lower-class, controlling for all other variables. Regarding the
middle-class respondents, their odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma
question are increased by 101.7% as compared to lower-class respondents
(p = .003). The results for upper-class respondents are even more
dramatic. Upper-class respondents have increased odds of 289.1% in
agreeing with the debt–stigma question as compared to lower-class
respondents (p < .001). Although not statistically significant for
respondents who self-identify as working-class (p=.379), their odds of
agreeing with the debt–stigma question are increased by 23% as compared
to lower-class respondents. In other terms, Model 3 suggests that selfidentified social class matters regarding whether a person will likely agree
with the debt–stigma question; the higher an individual’s perceived social
class and station in life, the more likely he or she will agree with the
suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question.
Model 4 introduces the covariate of education as a replacement for
self-identified social class as a measure of socioeconomic status.113 In the
GSS, the variable for education is a continuous variable (i.e., years of
education). However, for regression analysis this variable was recoded
into a categorical variable with the following four categories: (1) less than
a high school education; (2) high school education; (3) some college
experience; or (4) college education. Regarding education, as compared to
those respondents with a college education, respondents who possess less
than a high school education have reduced odds of 75% in agreeing with
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question, and this finding is statistically
significant (p < .001). Those who possess a high school education have
reduced odds of 74.06% in agreeing with the debt–stigma question as
compared to the college educated respondents, and this finding is also
statistically significant (p < .001). Finally, for the respondents who possess
some college experience, their odds are also reduced by 51.3% in agreeing
with the debt–stigma question as compared to the college educated, and
this finding is statistically significant (p < .001). In short, as a measure of
socioeconomic status, one’s level of education has a positive association
in agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. Thus, the higher a
112. Age remains statistically significant as well (p < .001). Additionally, with respect to race,
African-Americans remain statistically significant (p < .05). Again, as compared to whites, AfricanAmericans have reduced odds of 27.23% in agreeing with the debt–stigma question.
113. Age remains statistically significant as well (p < .001).
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person’s level of education, the more likely that they will agree with the
debt–stigma question.
Model 5 adds all four covariates for socioeconomic status, namely,
annual income, occupational prestige score, self-identified class, and
education, in order to determine the attenuation between variables. As
evidenced in Table 15, occupational prestige score and education remain
statistically significant, while self-identified class and annual income are
no longer so.114 Regarding occupational prestige, with each one-unit
increase in occupational prestige the odds increase by 1% in agreeing with
the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question (p < .05). For education, the same
observation from Model 4 carries over to Model 5; that is, as compared to
the college educated, respondents with less than a high school education
have reduced odds of 66.55% in agreeing with the debt–stigma question,
a result which is statistically significant (p < .001). Further, those who
possess a high school education have reduced odds of 67.55% in agreeing
with the debt–stigma question as compared to the college educated, a
statistically significant result (p < .001). Finally, respondents with some
college experience have reduced odds of 42.99% in agreeing with the
debt–stigma question as compared to those who have obtained a college
degree; this finding is statistically significant (p < .001).115
Model 6 adds the covariates of strength of religious affiliation and
political persuasion to test whether these variables attenuate the statistical
significance of the socioeconomic variables upon the debt–stigma
question. Because self-identified class and income were not statistically
significant in Model 5, these covariates were omitted from the final model,
Model 6. For measures of socioeconomic status, education and
occupational prestige score were included in the model. The working
hypothesis was that the more religious or more conservative (or both) a
respondent reported to be, this would cause him or her to be less likely to
agree with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. This pattern emerged as
demonstrated in Table 15.116 Regarding strength of religious affiliation, as
compared to those respondents who claimed to have no religious
affiliation (i.e., the reference category), respondents who have a
“somewhat strong” religious affiliation have reduced odds of 70.43% in
agreeing with the debt–stigma question, and this finding is statistically
114. Age remains statistically significant as well (p < .001).
115. Though not statistically significant in Model 5, the odds of agreeing with the suicide-uponbankruptcy question increase as self-identified social class increases. As compared to the selfidentified lower-class respondents, working-class respondents have increased odds of 2.4% in
agreeing with the question, middle-class respondents’ odds are 16% higher, and upper-class
respondents’ odds are 67% higher.
116. Age remains statistically significant as well (p < .001).
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significant (p < .001). For those reporting a “not very strong” religious
affiliation, the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question are reduced
by 49.43%, a finding that is also statistically significant (p < .001). For
those respondents reporting a “strong” religious affiliation, they have
reduced odds of 68.4% in agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy
question, and this too is statistically significant (p < .001). Consequently,
having some religious affiliation reduces an individual’s odds of agreeing
with the debt–stigma question.
The covariate of political persuasion is also statistically significant
and thus demonstrates a positive association with the debt–stigma
question. But much like the direction of religious affiliation, the data
suggest that as compared to those respondents who report a liberal political
affiliation (i.e., the reference group), moderates and conservatives have
reduced odds of agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question.
More specifically, and again as compared to liberals, political moderates
have reduced odds of 34.3% in agreeing with the question; this finding is
statistically significant (p < .001). Regarding conservative respondents,
the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question are reduced by 32.09%
as compared to liberals, and this too is statistically significant (p < .001).
The surprise in Model 6 is that although controlling for both strength
of religious affiliation and political persuasion, the socioeconomic
variables of occupational prestige and education remain positively
associated with the debt–stigma question.117 Regarding occupational
prestige, with each one-unit increase in occupational prestige score, the
odds of agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question increase by
.93% (p < .05). Regarding education, as again compared to the college
educated (i.e., the reference group), those respondents with less than a high
school education have reduced odds of 69.46% of agreeing with the
suicide-upon-bankruptcy question (p < .001). For those respondents
reporting a high school education, their odds of agreeing with the debt–
stigma question are reduced by 69.75% (p < .001). And finally, those
respondents who have some college experience have reduced odds of
45.87% in agreeing with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question
(p < .001).
Based upon the logistic regression models, the data present initial
evidence of a systematic pattern between debt stigma and social class,
namely, that one’s objective and subjective social class position predicts
an individual’s proclivity to agree with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy
question. More precisely, tested independently, the objective
socioeconomic indicators of annual income, education, and occupational
117. Like all other models, age remains statistically significant (p < .001).
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prestige are positively associated with the debt–stigma question. The
higher an individual’s annual income, educational level, and occupational
prestige score, the greater likelihood of him or her agreeing with the
proposition that a person has the right to take their own life upon “going
bankrupt.” This same conclusion holds true for subjective social class
when measured independently. That is, middle-class and upper-class
respondents have significantly greater odds of agreeing with the suicideupon-bankruptcy question as compared to lower-class respondents.
Further, once all of the objective and subjective covariates for
socioeconomic class are included in the model, the objective measures of
education and occupational prestige remain statistically significant; the
higher one’s educational level and the greater one’s occupational prestige,
the more likely that he or she is inclined to agree that suicide is a justifiable
response to an individual “going bankrupt.” As the final model
demonstrates, these two measures of objective socioeconomic class
remain relevant and statistically significant in predicting such a response,
even in the presence of two other statistically significant covariates that
reduce one’s proclivity to respond affirmatively to the suicide-uponbankruptcy question, namely, strength of religious affiliation and political
persuasion.
As other scholars have noted, “stigma . . . is linked to an individual’s
social identity.”118 The GSS data suggest that class distinctions exist
regarding debt or bankruptcy stigma, or both. Using the suicide-uponbankruptcy question as a proxy for stigma, the lower- and working- classes
report less stigma regarding debt and bankruptcy based upon their survey
responses. Inversely, the higher one’s social class as measured by income,
occupational prestige, and education, the more inclined one is in agreeing
with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy question. The next Part attempts to
situate these empirical findings within the sociological social psychology
literature in a first effort to explain this apparent social phenomenon.
III.

DISCUSSION

The results of the foregoing statistical tests paint an initial picture of
the connection between social class and debt stigma in the United States.
Simply stated, the data suggest a positive association between social class
and perceiving stigma regarding indebtedness. The higher an individual’s
social class as measured by the objective indicators of education, income,
and occupational prestige, as well as self-identified subjective class, the
greater the likelihood that he or she will agree with the acceptability of
118. Carol T. Miller & Cheryl R. Kaiser, A Theoretical Perspective on Coping with Stigma, 57
J. SOC. ISSUES 73, 74 (2001).
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suicide in response to “going bankrupt.” I contend that the American
structure of individualistic capitalism and social psychology offers a
framework for explaining why this is so.
From a structural standpoint, the explanation begins with the
American ideals of individualism and self-reliance. Peter L. Callero
defines the concept of “individualism” in the following terms:
[I]ndividualism is a belief system that privileges the individual over
the group, private life over public life, and personal expression over
social experience; it is a worldview where autonomy, independence,
and self-reliance are highly valued and thought to be natural; and it
is an ideology based on self-determination, where free actors are
assumed to make choices that have direct consequences for their own
unique destiny.119

Callero argues that individualism is not only “one of the most
dominant values in American society”120 but also the “defining
characteristic of American culture.”121 The American ideal of
individualism and self-reliance pervades all aspects of social life but
perhaps none more than our economic system. Indeed, under this societal
ethos of individualism and self-reliance in economic affairs, one’s social
position is the product of effort and talent.122 Consequently, individuals
are personally responsible for their class position.123 Despite the multitude
of structural forces that influence our economic class position and personal
finances, Americans remain tied to the notion that through some
combination of hard work, persistence, and raw talent, anyone can achieve
financial success and stability.124 The problem with this premise of
meritocracy, of course, is that it tends “to overestimate the effects of merit
on economic outcomes and to underestimate the effects of nonmerit
factors.”125 Nonetheless, Americans remain steadfast in the belief that
meritocracy undergirds our economic lives.126
Accepting as true that many, if not most, Americans adhere to the
concept of economic meritocracy, then those who find themselves clinging
119. PETER L. CALLERO, THE MYTH OF INDIVIDUALISM: HOW SOCIAL FORCES SHAPE OUR
LIVES 15 (2d ed. 2013).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. MARTIN N. MARGER, SOCIAL INEQUALITY: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES 226 (6th ed. 2014).
123. Id. at 227.
124. STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 215 (3d ed.
2014).
125. Id. at 11.
126. SUSAN T. FISKE, ENVY UP, SCORN DOWN: HOW STATUS DIVIDES US 9 (2011) (“[W]e
endorse meritocracy most highly in the economic sphere, where we tolerate inequality according to
merit.”).
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to the lower economic rungs in society deserve their fate. It is consequently
understandable that when financial calamity strikes an individual or family
and debt service simply becomes no longer manageable, attribution of the
economic plight is associated with personal failings and limitations. In a
society that “puts a heavy emphasis on personal agency and independent
effort, it can be difficult to recognize or acknowledge the controlling
influence of large social processes.”127
Americans’ general adherence to the social structure of economic
meritocracy has relevance for an individual’s social identity. In this
context, identity is the “internalized statuses” by which individuals
categorize and present themselves to the outside world.128 Stryker and
Burke’s observation that social structure can have consequences for an
individual’s social identity undergirds this assertion.129 In fact, Katherine
Newman explored this proposition in her classic ethnographic study of
downward mobility among the American middle-class. Although not
particular to debt stigma, Newman’s findings regarding occupational loss
provide a useful analogy. Newman concludes as follows on this point:
One’s occupation . . . [is] viewed as a test of commitment, and the
product of hard work and self-sacrifice. Cast this way, success is not
a matter of luck, good contacts, credentials, or technical skill but is a
measure of one’s moral worth, one’s willingness and ability to drive
beyond the limitations of self-indulgence and sloth. It is this equation
of occupational success and inner or moral qualities that rebounds on
the unemployed manager’s self-image, making him or her feel not
just unsuccessful but worthless.130

By analogy, becoming mired in debt and possibly needing to file for
bankruptcy as a result has “consequences that reach down deep to core
issues of self and identity.”131 Such financial distress is undoubtedly an
“overwhelming blow to one’s social identity and sense of self.”132 Simply
put, for many individuals, incurring substantial, unmanageable debt and
possibly needing to file for bankruptcy represents a disastrous fall from
the social class hierarchy, one that can shatter an individual’s sense of self
and identity.

127. CALLERO, supra note 119, at 113.
128. LIZABETH A. CRAWFORD & KATHERINE B. NOVAK, INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY:
SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 212 (2014).
129. See generally Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity
Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284 (2000).
130. KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF DOWNWARD
MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 76 (1988).
131. CALLERO, supra note 119, at 112.
132. Id. at 113.
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Based upon the findings of this study, it is the individuals with the
higher levels of education, the greater annual incomes, the higher
occupational prestige scores, and the higher self-identified class that are
most likely to agree with the suicide-upon-bankruptcy survey question.
The prospect of severe indebtedness is apparently so salient to their
internalized social identities and sense of social worth that these
respondents are accepting of suicide as a consequence of debt (at least as
indicated by their responses to the GSS). Perhaps this is so because, as
Thomas J. Gorman uncovered in his qualitative work, individuals judge
themselves on the bases of income, levels of education, and occupational
prestige.133 That is, components of self-worth include one’s educational
credentials, income, and occupational prestige. Further, one’s objective or
perceived social class can have a distinct effect on one’s response to a
particular situation. Rebecca Sandefur articulates this sentiment in the
following terms: “Social class and socioeconomic differences in how
people experience problems and respond to them can mean that the same
initial event . . . creates very different consequences for those in different
class positions.”134
The GSS data suggest that for individuals in the middle- and upperclasses, “going bankrupt” represents falling from a position of seemingly
hard-earned social status in the American economic meritocracy. In a
society that places so much emphasis on economic success, the incurrence
of unmanageable debt may be the quintessential symbol of economic
failure, one that speaks louder to middle- and upper-class individuals’
internal measure of self-worth and self-esteem. According to sociological
social psychology, the notion of self-esteem arises from three sources:
reflected appraisals, social comparisons, and self-perceptions.135
The first measure of self-esteem, reflected appraisals, harkens back
to Charles Cooley’s the “looking-glass self.”136 Simply stated, Cooley
argued that an individual’s sense of self, and by extrapolation one’s selfesteem, is developed through interactions with other members of
society.137 More particularly, reflected appraisals, which constitute
“images of yourself based on your perceptions of what other people think
about you,” form a “basis for creating and confirming self-concepts.”138
133. See generally Thomas J. Gorman, Cross-Class Perceptions of Social Class, 20 SOC.
SPECTRUM 93 (2000).
134. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34
ANN. REV. SOC. 339, 347 (2008).
135. CRAWFORD & NOVAK, supra note 128, at 213.
136. See generally CHARLES H. COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1902).
137. Id.
138. Charles Jaret, Donald C. Reitzes & Nadezda Shapkina, Reflected Appraisals and SelfEsteem, 48 SOC. PERSP. 403, 403–09 (2005).
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When an individual’s reflected appraisals from others match that person’s
salient identity, the person’s self-esteem is buoyed.139 In contrast, when
reflected appraisals no longer corroborate one’s identity, an individual’s
self-esteem can be damaged.140 As Charles Jaret and colleagues argue, it
can be “disconcerting and potentially deflating to one’s sense of having a
distinctive identity to realize that other people attach great significance to
categories such as one’s . . . social status,”141 especially if there is a
mismatch between perception and identity. If based upon one’s
possessions, occupation, income, and education others view him or her as
distinctly middle- or upper-class, the incurrence of unmanageable debt can
certainly cause a disconnect between a person’s reflected appraisals and
internalized identity as a member of the respected higher classes. As
Charles Jaret and colleagues found, when reflected appraisals relate to
one’s roles and statuses (such as social class), there is a negative relation
to self-esteem.142 This may explain why those in the middle- and upperclasses in the GSS, as measured by objective indicators of socioeconomic
status (i.e., education, income, and occupational prestige) and selfidentified class, are more inclined to agree with the acceptability of
committing suicide in response to indebtedness if they believe society in
general places importance on these markers of social class status.
With respect to the second measure of self-esteem, namely social
comparison, Susan Fiske notes that social comparison is a universal human
trait. As Fiske argues, “We compare in order to inform ourselves about
where we stand. We compare to protect our self-esteem. We compare to
identify ourselves with our peer group, those others who are similarly
situated.”143 Empirical evidence exists that middle-class and upper-class
individuals place great emphasis on the distinctions between themselves
and the lower social classes.144 Indeed, Michèle Lamont uncovered that
upper-middle-class Americans tend to exclude others on the basis of
socioeconomic superiority, as measured by education, income, and
occupational prestige.145 Further, as Thomas J. Gorman found in his study
of members from both the working-class and middle-class, people “judge
139. Morris Rosenberg & Leonard I. Pearlin, Social Class and Self-Esteem Among Children and
Adults, 84 AM. J. SOC. 53, 63 (1978).
140. Joanne M. Kaufman & Cathryn Johnson, Stigmatized Individuals and the Process of
Identity, 45 SOC. Q. 807, 827–28 (2004).
141. Jaret, Reitzes & Shapkina, supra note 138, at 405.
142. Id. at 403.
143. FISKE, supra note 126, at 27.
144. See generally Benjamin Sosnaud et al., Class in Name Only: Subjective Class Identity,
Objective Class Position, and Vote Choice in American Presidential Elections, 60 SOC. PROBS. 81
(2013).
145. MICHÈLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN: MORALITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
RACE, CLASS, AND IMMIGRATION 104 (2000).
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[another’s] worth on the basis of income, educational credentials, and
occupational prestige.”146 These reciprocal feelings of judgment and
comparison remain hidden but unquestionably serve to “shape daily
interactions among members of different social classes.”147 In
interviewing members of the middle-class, Gorman discovered that not
only do members of the middle-class fear downward mobility but they also
differentiate and distance themselves from members of the lower-class
based upon the markers of income, education, and occupational
prestige.148
In addition to distancing themselves from members of a lower-class
as a mechanism of social comparison, middle- and upper-class individuals
also utilize reference groups in the act of social comparison. In this regard,
the people in our own social network form the relevant comparisons,
which in turn set the standards for our behaviors and attitudes.149 As a
corollary, our self-identity and self-esteem “closely track[] feeling
included or excluded” in our referent social group.150 If this is the case, it
is not hard to envision that becoming mired in financial debt and possibly
resorting to bankruptcy damages the identity and self-esteem of those in
the middle- and upper- classes, namely those individuals who are supposed
to be the most economically successful in our financial meritocracy.
Indeed, grave indebtedness or filing for bankruptcy protection, or both,
arguably represents a falling from their own reference group and social
network, something that can undoubtedly distort one’s identity and selfesteem.
Finally, identity and self-esteem derive from internal evaluations of
our own role performances. In this sense, it is well-accepted by
sociological social psychologists that individuals routinely engage in
“identity work,” which Tony J. Watson describes, in part, as a process
whereby individuals make “connections ‘outwards’ to social others as well
as ‘inwards’ towards the self.”151 In other words, identity work, according
to Watson, is a process whereby individuals shape and evaluate their own
“internal identity” as measured against one’s “social identity.” Applied in
this context, if an individual’s social class is particularly salient to their
senses of self and identity, then the act of incurring unmanageable debt or
filing for bankruptcy relief represents a grave disconnect between

146. Gorman, supra note 133, at 102–03.
147. Id. at 105.
148. Id. at 112.
149. See generally FISKE, supra note 126.
150. Id. at 116.
151. Tony J. Watson, Managing Identity: Identity Work, Personal Predicaments and Structural
Circumstances, 15 ORG. 121, 140 (2008).
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identifying as middle- or upper-class, and a negative evaluation of role
performance is likely the end result.
CONCLUSION
This empirical Article offers a fresh perspective to the ongoing debt
and bankruptcy stigma literature by examining whether all debtors are
created equal or whether a segment of the American population does or
should view indebtedness differently based upon social class. As the data
from the GSS suggest, individuals with higher incomes, occupational
prestige scores, and levels of education are more likely to agree with the
survey question that an individual has a right to commit suicide upon
“going bankrupt.” This same observation holds true based upon an
individual’s self-identified social class, with those identifying as middleor upper-class having greater odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma
question.
Not only do these findings add to the social psychology literature on
self-esteem and personal identity based upon class, but the findings remain
relevant to consumer and bankruptcy law scholars alike in arguing for and
against policy changes to the Bankruptcy Code. As measured by specific
points over the past thirty years, the data indicate that debt stigma remains
a viable area of study and that the stigma surrounding indebtedness still
has salience for individuals’ everyday lives. In addition, the GSS data
suggest that debt stigma has increased rather than decreased over the past
thirty years, another potential finding of interest to bankruptcy and
consumer law scholars.152
The findings of this study suggest at least three avenues for future
research. First, to the extent that other datasets exist with the same variable
measures, similar statistical analyses can be done to test the findings of
this study. Second, qualitative and interpretive research designs can be
developed to explore this study’s initial findings by conducting in-depth
interviews with individuals (debtors and non-debtors alike) to explore
whether responses to indebtedness shift by objective and subjective
indicators of social class. This can be accomplished by purposefully
sampling for different social classes and by attempting to find
“disconfirming evidence”153 of this study’s general findings. Third, based
upon the results of the logistic regression models, age remained
statistically significant across all years, whereby increasing one’s age
152. See Sousa, supra note 110.
153. John W. Creswell & Dana L. Miller, Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry, 39
THEORY INTO PRAC. 124, 125 (2000) (noting that disconfirming evidence “is the process where
investigators first establish the preliminary themes or categories in a study and then search through
the data for evidence that is consistent with or disconfirms these themes”).
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decreased the odds of agreeing with the debt–stigma question.154 Future
researchers can explore this apparent association between age and debt
stigma both quantitatively and qualitatively.155
For the moment, based upon this initial study, it appears that
systematic patterns exist regarding notions of debt stigma in American
society and that individuals may view the phenomenon of grave
indebtedness quite differently based upon their relative positions in social
life. Further research in this area may tell us much more about debt, class,
and identity in American social life.

154. The same may be suggested with respect to race, as this variable proved to be statistically
significant at least in Model 2 and Model 3.
155. Indeed, such studies have already taken place. See, e.g., Patricia Drentea, Age, Debt and
Anxiety, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 437 (2000) (finding that financial strain is a potential daily
stressor, which falls more heavily upon younger adults starting careers and beginning families).

